In weak states, the central government, if there is one, lacks an effective monopoly over the use of force. Opposing factions bargain over political power and economic resources in the shadow of the threat of force. Any faction dissatisfied with a negotiated outcome can resort to force to try to impose a more favorable outcome. Some agreements negotiated in the shadow of power - be they truces, treaties, power-sharing agreements, or constitutions - hold while others do not. This project examines why some agreements hold and others do not and explores the the implications of this analysis for state formation and consolidation. This project shows that persistent fighting may result from the interaction of two features of the consolidation process. First, consolidation typically creates a commitment problem as the faction in control of the government cannot commit itself to not exploiting the stronger bargaining position it will have once the state consolidates. Second, fighting often impedes or forestalls the consolidation process and associated shifts in the distribution of power. The research links the observed pattern of fighting to the way the distribution of power shifts during the consolidation process. Factions cut deals and avoid fighting when the underlying distribution of power is stable or shifting slowly. Rapid shifts lead to fighting.
This award was funded through the Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation competition, a joint venture between NSF and the Department of Defense.
