Using a unique combination of social network, qualitative, and quantitative analyses, this project examines the social organization of lobbyists in Washington, D.C. Focusing on the social embeddedness of lobbyists and politicians, the relevant questions for analysis are how do social relations and trust-based norms among lobbyists operate? How do such interactions enhance policy interactions, if at all? Do embedded relationships within policy areas operate to exclude outsiders from the democratic process? This research will extend current knowledge of the political process by focusing on the social structure, informal interactions, and social norms of lobbying as a key part of policy making. Embeddedness and social norms have been shown to matter in a host of economic situations, but both economics and political science tend to present under- and over-socialized accounts of the political process. However, a middle path between such under- and over-socialized accounts that incorporates embeddedness in social networks, trust, and social norms can add much to our understanding of politics and democracy. This project expects to find that embedded social relationships and trust-based social norms enable and underpin everyday policy interactions among lobbyists and politicians. In addition, these same social relationships and norms erect a barrier to outside actors, who may include social activists or even the entities who hire and rely on lobbyists, such that outsiders characterize the insider relations and norms as collusive and corrupt. Social network analysis, traditional statistical analysis, and qualitative analysis are uniquely combnied in order to focus on the role of trust-based social norms that govern informal interactions within networked communities of lobbyists in two policy domains - higher education policy and retirement policy. The research will rely on federal lobbyist registration reports, in-depth interviews and surveys of political actors in Washington, as well as other publicly available information on lobbying. The knowledge gained from this study will help citizens understand the effect and importance of informal interactions in the political process. Moreover, this research has the potential of expanding knowledge by exploring an underutilized data source - lobbyist registration reports - as a source for the study of political interactions and outcomes. One intended by-product of this research will be to organize the lobbyist registration reports into useable attributional and social network datasets that will be available to other researchers and thereby encourage the combined use of different methodologies. Another hoped-for impact will be greater transparency of lobbyists' activities. This research, in the course of its dissemination to a wider public, will highlight shortfalls and deficiencies in reporting by lobbyists and hopefully improve the collection of lobbyist information by the Congress

Agency
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Institute
Division of Social and Economic Sciences (SES)
Type
Standard Grant (Standard)
Application #
0602388
Program Officer
Patricia White
Project Start
Project End
Budget Start
2006-03-15
Budget End
2007-08-31
Support Year
Fiscal Year
2006
Total Cost
$7,448
Indirect Cost
Name
Cornell University
Department
Type
DUNS #
City
Ithaca
State
NY
Country
United States
Zip Code
14850