In civil wars over the past half-century, some 18 million people lost their lives. In many of these wars, despite a Mao Tse-tung image of rebels winning hearts and minds, civilians pay the heaviest cost, with high levels of displacement, malnutrition, and disease. These indirect costs of war are ultimately more damaging than the fighting.
But there is significant variation in the relative costs paid by civilians and those paid by soldiers. For example, in Sri Lanka, the ratio of civilian to soldier deaths was 1:1; meanwhile in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that ratio was more than 100:1. This leads to the question of why some rebel groups create order in their territories, while others abuse and prey upon the civilian population. State-of-the-art answers to this question in political science focus mostly on how rebels get funded and on the strategic balance between rebels and state militias.
The dissertation proposes a new theory of rebel group behavior based on the internal dynamics of rebel organizations. It assumes that rebel leaders have an economic incentive to create order in their territories but are often unable to prevent group members from looting and abusing the civilian population. While earlier theories saw a positive relationship of resources and predatory behavior, this project's theory predicts that rebel leaders will exert more effective control over their subordinates when they have access to financial resources. A second factor predicting restraint on predatory behavior is that of close ethnic/social ties between leaders and their commanders. Finally, the project has identified a third factor so far ignored in the literature. The researcher finds that the goals of external patrons matter, and in cases of predatory behavior, there are incentives by foreign suppliers to support weak leaders who can be more easily manipulated, resulting in abusive, factionalized groups.
Applied to the civil war in Liberia, 1989-2003, this model predicts variation among Liberia's rebel groups, depending on the factors listed above. To test the model, the project uses a remote sensing methodology developed in the earth sciences. Satellite images are processed to measure changes in crop area as a proxy for civilian abuse during Liberia's war. These crop estimates are combined with systematic data on rebel group characteristics collected through 14 months of field work, as well as geographic and demographic data. Preliminary results indicate significant variation in crop area over time, consistent with the model's predictions. The model is further tested on an original, cross-national dataset of rebel groups, 1945-2003.
The study of civil war has been constrained by a lack of reliable, micro-level data. This dissertation develops a rigorous method for overcoming these limitations while also offering a theoretical contribution to the field. Through its emphasis on food security and intra-group bargaining, the dissertation provides concrete implications for designing humanitarian interventions and successful peace agreements.
In civil wars over the past half-century, some 18 million people lost their lives. In many of these wars, despite a Mao Tse-tung image of rebels winning hearts and minds, civilians pay the heaviest cost, with high levels of displacement, malnutrition, and disease. These indirect costs of war are ultimately more damaging than the fighting. But there is significant variation in the relative costs paid by civilians and those paid by soldiers. For example, in Sri Lanka, the ratio of civilian to soldier deaths was 1:1; meanwhile in DR Congo, that ratio was more than 100:1. This leads to the question of why some rebel groups create order in their territories, while others abuse and prey upon the civilian population. State of the art answers to this question in political science focus mostly on how rebels get funded and on the strategic balance between rebels and state militias. This research project proposes a new theory of rebel group behavior and cohesion based on the internal dynamics of rebel organizations. It assumes that rebel leaders have an economic incentive to create order in their territories, but are often unable to prevent group members from looting and abusing the civilian population. While earlier theories saw a positive relationship of resources and predatory behavior, my theory predicts that rebel leaders will exert more effective control over their subordinates when they have access to financial resources. A second factor predicting restraint on predatory behavior is that of close ethnic/social ties between leaders and their commanders. Finally, I have identified a third factor so far ignored in the literature. I find that the goals of external patrons shape rebel behavior. To maximize their influence over the rebels' activities, some foreign suppliers have incentives to support weak, untrustworthy leaders and withhold resources that could strengthen leader control, resulting in more abusive, faction-prone groups. To test this theory against existing explanations, I compiled a dataset of rebel group financing and behavior that covers all groups that controlled territory during 1980-2003. Consistent with the theory, and contrary to existing theories, I find that increased leader financing is strongly associated with less civilian abuse and a lower risk of group factionalization. I also uncover a systematic relationship between the goals and identities of external patrons and group behavior. For example, rebels supported by foreign governments are more abusive and more prone to factionalization than groups that do not receive state support. Also consistent with the theory, I find that lootable resources increase abusiveness and the risk of factionalization, while ethnic ties among the rebels decrease these outcomes. Applied to the civil war in Liberia, 1989-2003, this model predicts variation among Liberia’s rebel groups, depending on the factors listed above. To test the model, I use a remote sensing methodology developed in the earth sciences. Satellite images are processed to measure changes in crop area as a proxy for civilian security during Liberia’s war. These crop estimates are combined with systematic data on rebel group characteristics collected through 14 months of field work, as well as geographic and demographic data. The spatial patterns of civilian security strongly support the theory's predictions. The NPFL rebels, with access to leader financing, provided greater security to civilians than resource-poor groups such as LURD and LPC. Consistent with the theory, security was lowest near LURD and LPC bases and in areas that contained lootable resources. The results of the resarch project yield several policy implications for civil war intervention. First, sanctions on rebel sources of revenue should not be used in isolation, but rather as an integrated element of a larger intervention package. Second, international actors can influence rebel behavior and create more durable peace agreements by offering post-conflict rewards to group commanders, conditional on group discipline. Third, humanitarian aid organizations seeking access to rebel areas should negotiate directly with the rebel leader; if the leader is unable to provide sufficient security, the organizations should consider suspending their operations. Fourth, effective control over arms and ammunition is the most direct way of preventing rebellion. Fifth, state sponsorshop of rebellion should be discouraged through tough international sanctions.
