Biological thought is one of the best instances of the 'concepts in theories' theme that has recently become so central to the study of concept structure. But the new consensus on the embedding of concept structure in larger systems of causal-explanatory beliefs has not led to a comparable consensus on how that embedding comes about. A series of studies will explore the emergence of biological concepts in childhood with the general goal of better understanding how concepts and larger systems of explanation become intertwined. This goal leads to the following questions: do biological concepts initially emerge out of other conceptual domains such as a naive psychology or mechanics, do they emerge out of general associative processes with no initial influences of other theoretical biases, or do they appear along yet another path? Are there early influences on biological thought giving it a unique character that perseveres from preschool years on through childhood and into adulthood? How should developmental changes in biological concepts be described when invariant principles might also be present? These issues will be examined through a series of studies on a wide range of biological phenomena including: disease, inheritance, physiology and kindhood. Contrasts are drawn to superficially similar phenomena from the domains of social regularities and physical mechanical laws. It is expected that: 1. young children will see common properties and mechanisms among both animals and plants, suggesting an awareness of living things based neither on absorption into other domains, nor on pre- theoretical similarity relations, nor on animacy; 2. a small set of common principles will reappear in domain after domain, suggesting a unified conceptual approach to living things; 3. these distinctions serve as principles that give unity and coherence to conceptual change in biology; and 4. more general principles will be found concerning how concepts emerge within larger sets of causal/explanatory beliefs. Research of this sort relates to health in two ways. First, by providing insight into basic models of cognitive development, it helps us better understand boundary conditions on the normal course of mental development. Second, since biological thought is the object of study, insights gained will be relevant to issues concerning how both experts and the general public understand bio-medical phenomena.

Agency
National Institute of Health (NIH)
Institute
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health & Human Development (NICHD)
Type
Research Project (R01)
Project #
5R01HD023922-08
Application #
2199014
Study Section
Human Development and Aging Subcommittee 3 (HUD)
Project Start
1988-02-01
Project End
1998-01-31
Budget Start
1995-02-01
Budget End
1996-01-31
Support Year
8
Fiscal Year
1995
Total Cost
Indirect Cost
Name
Cornell University
Department
Psychology
Type
Schools of Arts and Sciences
DUNS #
City
Ithaca
State
NY
Country
United States
Zip Code
14850
Keil, Frank C (2010) The Feasibility of Folk Science. Cogn Sci 34:826-862
Mills, Candice M; Keil, Frank C (2008) Children's developing notions of (im)partiality. Cognition 107:528-51
Mills, Candice M; Keil, Frank C (2005) The development of cynicism. Psychol Sci 16:385-90
Danovitch, Judith H; Keil, Frank C (2004) Should you ask a fisherman or a biologist?: Developmental shifts in ways of clustering knowledge. Child Dev 75:918-31
Mills, Candice M; Keil, Frank C (2004) Knowing the limits of one's understanding: the development of an awareness of an illusion of explanatory depth. J Exp Child Psychol 87:1-32
Kim, Nancy S; Keil, Frank C (2003) From symptoms to causes: diversity effects in diagnostic reasoning. Mem Cognit 31:155-65
Lutz, Donna J; Keil, Frank C (2002) Early understanding of the division of cognitive labor. Child Dev 73:1073-84
Gutheil, G; Vera, A; Keil, F C (1998) Do houseflies think? Patterns of induction and biological beliefs in development. Cognition 66:33-49
Keil, F C; Smith, W C; Simons, D J et al. (1998) Two dogmas of conceptual empiricism: implications for hybrid models of the structure of knowledge. Cognition 65:103-35
Barrett, J L; Keil, F C (1996) Conceptualizing a nonnatural entity: anthropomorphism in God concepts. Cogn Psychol 31:219-47

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