The proposed research uses a game theoretical framework to test the hypothesis that fishers generate simple institutional norms that modify the incentive structure of pirating relative to FAD (fish aggregating device) fishing. The research tests hypotheses about sociality in the ethnographic context of a small-scale (artisanal) FAD fishery in the Commonwealth of Dominica, a Caribbean island nation. FADs are simple, human-made structures designed to float on or near the surface of the ocean, attract fish, and facilitate their capture. Difficult to defend from free-riders (pirates in the local vernacular) because they are placed in the open ocean, the recently (1999) introduced FAD technology produces a classic common pool resource dilemma (CPR). In spite of the CPR dilemma, FAD technology has now spread to most of the major fish landing sites on Dominica. The goal of the project is to learn how fishers achieve the level of cooperation that they do in spite of a context that structurally favors free riding. Predictions will be tested with data collected from interviews, direct observation, and GPS tracking of fishing trips. The large yellowfin tuna and blue marlin now targeted with the aid of FADs are species that were difficult for fishermen to regularly find in the past.
Small scale fisheries have a significant impact on food security and poverty reduction in the Caribbean region. The project will have broad positive impact by contributing to the Dominica Fisheries Division's goal to develop sound FAD policy and practice and create a national FAD Fishery Management Plan whose objective is the efficient and sustainable use of FADs and associated pelagic resources. The proposed research has intellectual merit by linking aspects of evolutionary theory, common pool resource theory and game theory to address core theoretical issues concerning the exceptional nature of human sociality.
