The ability to invent and reason about abstract domains such as time, ideas, or mathematics is uniquely human, and arguably the very hallmark of human sophistication. Yet, how people mentally represent these abstract domains has remained one of the great mysteries of the mind. Metaphors in language suggest a potential solution. When people talk about abstract phenomena like time, they often recruit words and expressions from more concrete or perceptually rich domains, such as space. Is it possible that metaphoric language reveals something fundamental about the way people conceptualize abstract domains? Relationships between spatial perception, spatial representation, and spatial language will be investigated using a combination of psycholinguistic and non-linguistic methods, including Remote Eye Tracking. Predicted results of these studies would support the claim that metaphors in language can provide a window on people's nonlinguistic mental representations, and would suggest that the form and content of even our ? most sophisticated and abstract mental efforts may depend upon our perceptual-motor neural architecture, and may be shaped both by linguistic experience and by physical experience in perception and motor action. ? ?
| Casasanto, Daniel; Henetz, Tania (2012) Handedness shapes children's abstract concepts. Cogn Sci 36:359-72 |
| Casasanto, Daniel; Chrysikou, Evangelia G (2011) When left is ""right"". Motor fluency shapes abstract concepts. Psychol Sci 22:419-22 |
| Willems, Roel M; Hagoort, Peter; Casasanto, Daniel (2010) Body-specific representations of action verbs: neural evidence from right- and left-handers. Psychol Sci 21:67-74 |
| Casasanto, Daniel; Jasmin, Kyle (2010) Good and bad in the hands of politicians: spontaneous gestures during positive and negative speech. PLoS One 5:e11805 |
| Casasanto, Daniel; Dijkstra, Katinka (2010) Motor action and emotional memory. Cognition 115:179-85 |
| Casasanto, Daniel (2008) Similarity and proximity: when does close in space mean close in mind? Mem Cognit 36:1047-56 |
